Archive for the ‘Socio-Political’ Category

Photo from Bayan USA


The Philippine negotiators of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement are working overtime to spread lies and misinformation about the recently signed military agreement. They want to make it appear that we are not on the losing end and in fact have everything to gain from the agreement. It is important that we debunk these arguments and expose the EDCA for the one-sided pact that it is.


  1. The Myth that EDCA is mutually beneficial – The EDCA has been described as mutually beneficial for the US and PH. It is portrayed as something we need to modernize our backward AFP. In fact, because of the supposed mutual benefits from the EDCA, the PH government has decided that we should let the US troops use of facilities for free and our utilities tax-free. What does the US stand to gain? A lot. The US gains free access to PH lands and waters, existing AFP camps and other facilities, for the stationing and rotational deployment of troops, giving the US a platform for power projection in the region, as well as a launching pad for possible military intervention. And they get this at the cheapest possible price. The Philippines on the other hand is supposed to benefit from this pact through the modernization of the AFP. However, nowhere in the EDCA does it state how the AFP will modernize through the frequent war games, the storage or prepositioning of weapons and other forms of interaction with US troops. The agreement does not say how the AFP will acquire X amount of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, vessels and technology as benefits for the use of our facilities. In fact, all relocatable or movable items owned by the US forces will be brought back to the US, leaving us with only empty buildings. Prepositioned materials which include weapons shall be for the exclusive use of US forces and can be moved out of the country anytime. Finally, if indeed US military presence will lead to modernization, we should have accomplished this a long time ago when we had US bases for 44 years and the VFA for 15 years now.


  1. The Myth that we are in control – Philippine negotiators say that the EDCA is different from the RP-US Bases Agreement because we are in control. US troops are here upon the consent of the PH government. The Philippines retains ownership of the facilities and the Philippine base commander or the designated representative has access to the US facilities. The Philippines also retains primary responsibility for security. All these look good on paper. The reality however is that the US will retain operational control of the “agreed locations” and shall “exercise all rights and authorities” to ensure their operational control. This includes putting in place security measures that would necessarily limit access to their facilities. Philippine access will have to comply with the “safety and security requirements” that will be imposed by the US.  There lies one of the great ironies under the EDCA. We entered an agreement that allows the US unlimited access to our facilities while limiting our access to theirs.  A historical footnote: In 1979, when the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was reviewed, the US bases were placed under the formal control of the Philippines, and were considered US bases within Philippine facilities. They were even placed under a Filipino base commander. The Philippine flag also flew in these bases and the Philippine government was to provide security along the bases’ perimeter. None of these acts diminished the fact that the bases still violated our sovereignty. Lastly, the idea that US troops are here upon our consent and invitation is just a fee-good provision that does little to mitigate the one-sidedness of this pact.


  1. The Myth that EDCA is a deterrent against China – This myth is related to the first myth of mutual benefits. The argument is that the EDCA will help us modernize our AFP thus enabling us to stand up to China’s incursions. Since the EDCA will not help our AFP modernize, we are left with the next best thing; that is for the US to come to our defense if attacked by China. However, nowhere in the EDCA does it say that the US will come to our aid if attacked by China. Neither does this assurance appear in other agreements like the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty. In fact, when US President Barack Obama was asked the same question during his Manila trip, he did not give any categorical answer nor firm commitment.


  1. The Myth that EDCA does not require Senate ratification – PH negotiators say that the EDCA is not a basing treaty therefore does not require Senate ratification. It is merely an implementation of existing treaties like the MDT. Sec. 25 of Art. XVIII of the PH Constitution states that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate… and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” So long as it involves foreign troops or facilities (even for the sake of argument they are not bases), the agreement must go through the Senate. EDCA deals with the activities of foreign troops including their right to put up their own facilities in the so-called agreed locations. To be valid under our Constitution, EDCA should have been ratified by the Philippine Senate and recognized as a treaty by the US Senate.  So why didn’t they just do that? The Executive was rushing the signing of the secretly negotiated agreement in time for the Obama visit. Bringing it to the Senate would mean a long, tedious process of public hearings and debates. Also, the Executive wants the agreement so badly it was not sure if it wanted to take the risk of subjecting the EDCA to the 2/3 Senate vote requirement stated in the Constitution.


  1. The Myth that these are not bases – Related to No.4, PH officials say the EDCA does not deal with bases and thus does not require Senate concurrence. First point we should consider is how the US will operate these “agreed locations”. Article III, Sec. 1 of the EDCA grants US force and private contractors access to “agreed locations” where they can conduct a broad range of activities including but not limited to; training, support, refueling of aircraft, bunkering of vehicles, temporary maintenance of vehicles, temporary accommodation of personnel, communications, prepositioning of equipment, supplies and materiel, and even deploying forces and materiel. Those are the operations of a base. But these are different from the old bases in Clark and Subic, they say. The US military pivot now calls for flexible basing opportunities that are not necessarily in the mold of formal bases like Clark and Subic. Second point we should consider is permanence. An indefinite number of US forces will be rotated in the country, meaning, at any given time, there will always be US troops stationed on our soil. The prototype of this is the US Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, 600 US Special Forces who have been based in Zamboanga since 2002 supposedly providing counter-terrorism training to PH troops. Third, US forces will be allowed to put up permanent structures, which imply that the presence of US forces will be for the long haul. Fourth, the agreement itself enables the permanent presence of US forces because the EDCA is in effect indefinitely, beyond the so-called 10 year term. Yes, the EDCA will remain “automatically” in effect even after 10 years, unless it is terminated by one of the parties.


We need to expose and shatter the myths being propagated by the Aquino government regarding the EDCA. The Aquino regime did something worse than the sell-out of our sovereignty. It gave it away for free. It betrayed the Filipino people. None of us were consulted. None of us even saw the contents of the pact before it was signed.

We don’t need to wait 10 years. For our sake and those of the future generations who stand to experience life under another US military occupation and a back-slide to colonialism, we have to scrap the EDCA now. ##



Photo from DZRHNews


  1. The scope is very broad. Article II, Sec.4- The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ((EDCA) provides US forces “agreed locations” where they can conduct a broad range of activities. The agreement does not set any limits on what areas throughout the country could be accessed by US troops, how many troops can be allowed in these areas or facilities, and for how long these troops will be allowed to stay. For all intents and purposes, the entire country can host US troops. US forces can access and put up facilities in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, making the agreement broader in scope compared to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement where bases were confined to Clark and Subic. There is also the question on the limits of the activities that can be undertaken in the “agreed locations”, for example, if the US would operate secret prisons or rendition sites in the Philippines, which would be contrary to law.


  1. The EDCA will mean permanent US presence – Article I, Sec.1 (b)- US troops will be given authority to access “agreed facilities” on a rotational basis. The agreement does not define what “rotational” means. In practice, under the VFA rotational deployment would mean the changing of personnel deployed in an area, resulting in the permanent presence of the troops. In Mindanao, 600 US Special Forces are being rotated, resulting in their permanent presence in the island since 2002. Rotational presence is euphemism for permanent presence. The provision that the EDCA will not lead to permanent presence or basing is worthless.


  1. The US will operate facilities as military bases and will drag us into overseas conflicts- Article III, Sec. 1 – The EDCA grants US force and private contractors access to “agreed locations” where they can conduct a broad range of activities including but not limited to; training, support, refueling of aircraft, bunkering of vehicles, temporary maintenance of vehicles, temporary accommodation of personnel, communications, prepositioning of equipment, supplies and materiel, and deploying forces and materiel. From the description above, the “agreed locations” will be operated as US military bases. One new feature of the EDCA is that it explicitly allows the Philippines to be a staging ground for US operations overseas.  This could range from being a launching pad of drone strikes, and other offensive operations that would make the Philippines involved in US conflicts abroad.


  1. The entire country could be an operating base- Article III, Sec. 2 – The Philippines shall assist transit or temporary access by US forces to “public land and facilities (including roads, ports and airfields), including those owned by local governments, and to other land and facilities (including roads, ports and airfields). Again, the entire country can be used by US forces, making the EDCA much broader in scope than the previous RP-US Military Bases Agreement. It bears stressing that the pact does not define what “temporary access” means, except that it is distinct from “transit” or US forces just passing through.


  1. US forces will get a lot of perks under the EDCA. Article III, Sec.3 – US forces shall have access to “agreed locations” “without rental or similar costs”. So not only will US troops get unlimited access, they can also stay here rent-free. Article VII, Sec. 1 – US forces and their private military contractors can use utilities such as water and electricity but will be tax-exempt, with their supposed taxes being paid for by the Philippine government. Article 7 Sec.2- US forces will also be allowed radio frequencies free of charge.


  1. The illusion that we’re in-charge. Article III, Sec.4 – US forces will retain “operational control” of the “agreed locations” and will have authority to undertake construction of permanent facilities and improvement of existing facilities as well as put in place their own security measures. In Article 3 Sec.5, Philippine authorities shall have access to the entire area of the “agreed locations but this will be subject to the “safety and security requirements” agreed upon by the parties. Based on this, PH access to the US operated facilities will still have to go through “safety and security requirements” set by the US.  The Philippines will retain ownership of all facilities, at least on paper. Agreed locations, including permanent facilities built by the US will be turned over to the PH once the US no longer uses them. There is the possibility that the US will be compensated for the improvements and construction that they will undertake. So yes, on paper we own these facilities but these will only be returned to us if the US no longer has use for them, and we also might have to pay the US some form of compensation.


  1.  The Philippines as weapons depot. The US will be allowed to preposition equipment in the “agreed locations” and facilities (Article IV, Sec.1). These prepositioned equipment and war materiel shall be for the exclusive use of the US. These include, but not limited to, supplies for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Weapons and other possible hazardous materials may be among the items that can be stored in Philippines. The country will become a huge weapons depot, where Filipino troops become glorified security guards for the US forces and their equipment (Article VI, Sec 2). Surely this does nothing to help modernize the AFP.


  1. Our hands are tied. – Under Article XI, the PH cannot bring disputes arising from the agreement to any local or international court or third-party arbitration. All disputes will be settled exclusively through consultations by both parties. This effectively ties the hands of the Philippines and as a Atty. Sarah Arriola pointed out, grants immunity to US troops before the ICC. In cases such as environmental damage similar to the Tubbataha reef grounding of the USS Guardian, the EDCA does not provide guidelines for compensation (Article IX on the environment). Even in the event of the unintentional release of hazardous materials or waste, or an oil spill, the EDCA says the US will take action contain the hazard. However, the EDCA is silent on damages. (A side note, Article IX Sec.3 implies that the US will indeed be bringing in hazardous materials and hazardous waste into the country.)


  1. The EDCA gives almost the same treatment as regular US forces to private defense contractors.  Contractors can have “unimpeded access” to the “agreed locations” and to the prepositioned materiel and supplies (Article IV, Sec.4). US private contractors are notorious worldwide for their violations and for shielding the US government from accountability. EDCA will see a rise in the number of private contractors operating in the country. Article VIII Sec. 1 allows US forces to hire private contractors without restriction as to choice of contractor, supplier or person who provides materiel, supplies and services. These same private contractors are also tax-exempt when it comes to the use of utilities such as water and electricity.
  2. The agreement is in effect indefinitely. While Article XII Sec 4 says that the agreement is in effect initially for 10 years, “it shall continue in force automatically unless terminated by either Party.” Now given the indefinite nature of the agreement, and the rotational presence of US troops all over country, free of charge by the way, the EDCA is worse than the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.

The EDCA is an affront to our sovereignty. It highlights our unequal relations with an imperialist power. The EDCA violates the 1987 constitution as it ensures permanent presence of US troops and the return of US bases under a broader, more flexible and more insidious arrangement and that this is done absent a treaty. As for the supposed benefits, nowhere in the agreement does it state how the AFP will actually modernize through the so-called joint exercises, rotational deployment of US troops and the prepositioning of weapons and materiel. Indeed, the benefits are close to nil. It is the US who stands to gain from the pact as it gets a stable foothold for power projection and military intervention in Southeast Asia.


Our duty is to fight this agreement, to fight the new US military occupation of our land.


Photo from Manila Bulletin

Two days ago, the Manila Standard reported the supposed P2 billion Tarlac road projects funded by the controversial Disbursement Acceleration Program which first appeared in this blog. The news report confirmed funding for the road project, with Malacanang saying that there is nothing wrong if the President pours in P2 billion for public works in his home province. Malacanang seems to have forgotten that time when Arroyo was being criticized for funding so many projects in her home province of Pampanga.

In any case, we should look closer at the projects being funded by the so-called DAP. Some projects are either implemented because of patronage politics or because they provide an opportunity for corruption (or both). The DAP spending submitted by the DBM to the SC belies the government propaganda that the DAP was supposed to stimulate the economy and have a positive effect on growth.

In all their memos to the President, Abad and the DBM always claim that the proposed additional projects have been chosen based on three criteria:

a)      their multiplier impact on the economy and infrastructure development

b)      their beneficial effect on the poor

c)       their translation into disbursements

Against these criteria, let us now examine some of the uses of DAP based on an October 2011 memo to the President by the DBM.

The DAP was used by the Department of Agrarian Reform to pay P5.432 billion as landowner’s compensation. DAP’s beneficial effect and multiplier impact on the economy is achieved by paying landlords? How much do you think would go to compensating landlords that are political allies of the regime? Was DAP also used to compensate Luisita landlords?

The Department of Justice used P11 million through DAP for the operating requirements of 50 investigation agents and 15 state attorneys.

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPPAP) was given P1.819 billion through DAP as supplementary budget for unfunded GPH-CPLA peace pact livelihood projects, support for so-called peace and development communities of the MNLF, PAMANA communications plan, support for reintegration of CPP-NPA rebels, farm-to-market roads, health centers, multi-purpose halls, livelihood and agriculture production etc. So OPPAP now wants to play congressman with its own set of infrastructure and livelihood projects for the implementation of questionable peace deals?

The DPWH had P5.5 billion for “various infrastructure projects” usually upon the recommendation of politicians. To quote the DBM, “the requested amount shall provide for additional priority infrastructure projects of the DPWH which include road, bridges and flood control projects. Many of the identified projects are quick-disbursing projects below P40 million which will be implemented by the district offices nationwide”. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out how corruption will take place in this set up.

There’s also the P6.5 billion “LGU support fund” also released through DAP which was justified as a buffer for the cut in the IRA share of LGU’s. The support fund was set up for “LGU’s requiring financial assistance to implement projects under a prescribed menu”. This definitely stinks like pork. LGU’s lining up to the DBM and DILG to get “financial assistance”? Good old-fashioned patronage politics.

There’s the P8.592 billion ARMM Transition and Investment Support Plan that covers “improvement of service delivery performance, creation of enabling environment for PPP towards equitable growth, improvement of public safety and security, cleansing the electoral system etc. This DAP allocation is supposed to be implemented by several agencies. The very description of the project raises a lot of questions on its legitimacy.

Still on the DILG, there is the P250 million Performance Challenge Fund that claims to be “People Powered Community Driven Development”, an empowerment fund that covers “various capacity building activities for the poor and participatory poverty action planning and budgeting projects in crafting local anti-poverty plans in the poorest municipalities. The project is jointly undertaken with the DSWD and NAPC. Pork, this time in the guise of poverty alleviation.

Residents of North Triangle in Quezon City should know that P11 billion was supposedly allotted for in-city housing for “20,000 informal settler families”, along with the construction of a Medium Rise Building in Camarin, Caloocan. We should find out the status of this housing project, especially in the aftermath of the very violent demolition of residents recently. Are they even aware that an MRB project is waiting for them in Caloocan?

To illustrate where congressional and presidential pork intersect, there is the DAP to cover PDAF projects, under the title “Various Other Local Projects”, worth a whopping P6.5 billion. This will be used to augment presumably existing projects already funded by PDAF. That DAP is used to augment graft-ridden PDAF projects shows how this program cannot be but part of the system of corruption.

It gets better for 2012.

In a memorandum to the President dated June 25, 2012, Abad  again sought authority to utilize government savings (DAP) for “big ticket projects” such as the “National Road Projects” in the President’s home province of Tarlac amounting to P2 billion.

Abad also recommended the use of DAP to fund the fraud-tainted Tulay ng Pangulo para sa Kaunlaran project which began under the Arroyo administration. Around P1.8 billion was recommended for this, where P500 million will be sourced from DAR. These bridges are supposed to help farmers, but may have ended up, like in the past, bridges to nowhere.

Abad sought authority to use pooled government savings to fund “urgent” and “critical” projects such as a P5 billion Tourism Road Infrastructure Project, and again the so-called “priority local projects” nationwide amounting to an additional P8.295 billion.

Some P1.6 billion meanwhile was supposed to be allotted for the “Capability Requirements for the Operations of the Philippine Coast Guard in the West Philippine Sea”. How funding the Coast Guard in the West Philippine Sea has a multiplier impact on the economy and a beneficial effect on the poor is not clear from the memo.

Clearly, in many cases, the DAP projects mentioned here do not fulfill the three criteria set by the DBM. Many of the projects do not really have a multiplier impact on the economy or have any beneficial effect on the poor, especially not when projects become wells of corruption. The submission by the DBM to the SC undermines governments own claims that the DAP was a necessary stimulus program. Billions went to infrastructure projects, including those already funded by the PDAF, raising concerns about corruption. Tigilan na ang panloloko sa taong-bayan. The only thing stimulated by the DAP was the appetite for corruption by government officials.

DAP is a tool for patronage politics — for influence over lawmakers and local officials– as well as an opportunity for greater corruption in the form of lump-sum allocations.

What is alarming is that while the Solicitor General says that DAP is no more, the authority invoked to create DAP still remains. Presidential pork still remains. Our work is far from over then.  ###




From Ibon’s November 6, 2013 release:

The Aquino administration defends the controversial Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) as, among other things, stimulating the economy in 2011 and creating momentum that continues until today. Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III in particular claimed that the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in the fourth quarter of 2011. However this is an exaggerated interpretation of a misleading World Bank report.

  • ·         Pres. Aquino based his claim on the World Bank’s  March 2012 Philippines Quarterly Update which said that “the government’s DAP was partially successful and contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth in [the fourth quarter of 2011]“.  The same report clarifies, although only in a footnote, that this  “1.3 percentage point” contribution actually refers to the contribution of total government consumption and public construction and not just of DAP-related spending.
  • ·         DAP-related spending was only a portion of total government spending in the fourth quarter of 2011. The Php61.4 billion in actual disbursements under DAP accounted for just 19.8% of Php309.7 billion in total government spending in the fourth quarter (Php309.7 billion) and just 5.4% of total government spending for the year (Php1,144.2 billion). Total spending is the sum of government final consumption expenditure (GFCE) and public construction in the national income accounts measured at current prices.
  • ·         The hype about the supposed contribution of DAP to growth is a selective use of statistics. GFCE actually grew slower at 6.4% in 2011 from 2010 compared to 10.6% growth in 2010 from 2009; public construction meanwhile contracted by 29.5% in 2011 after 8.1% growth in 2010. These are measured at current prices. Real GDP growth in 2011 of 3.9% was also a marked slowdown from 7.6% in 2010.
  • ·         The real contribution of DAP-related spending to economic growth is likely just one-fourth of a percentage point at most in the fourth quarter of 2011 and an even more negligible fraction for 2011 as a whole.



During last week’s SC oral arguments, the Solicitor General said that the Disbursement Acceleration Program no longer exists thus making the petitions before the court moot. The line was new insofar as we’ve never heard this from the President, during his televised defense of DAP or during media interviews. Of course it is a bit of a stretch to argue that the petitions should be thrown out because the DAP has been terminated as early as mid-2013. Constitutional issues remain.

More importantly, accountability issues remain. Look at how DAP was probably used in 2012 based on a memorandum from the Department of Budget and Management.

In a memorandum to the President dated June 25, 2012, DBM secretary Butch Abad sought authority to utilize government savings (DAP) for “big ticket projects” such as the “National Road Projects” in the President’s home province of Tarlac amounting to P2 billion. No other lucky province received such allotment for that year based on the memo. The project had prior approval by the President.

DBMs Abad also recommended the use of DAP to fund the fraud-tainted Tulay ng Pangulo para sa Kaunlaran project which began under the Arroyo administration. Around P1.8 billion was recommended for this, where P500 million will be sourced from DAR. The project had prior approval by the President.

Abad sought authority to use pooled government savings to fund “urgent” and “critical” projects such as a P5 billion Tourism Road Infrastructure Project, along with “priority local projects” nationwide amounting to an additional P8.295 billion. We suspect that these “priority local projects”, often considered priorities upon the recommendation of politicians, could be where the pork for lawmakers goes. At the time of the memo, the projects have not yet been approved by the President.

Some P1.6 billion meanwhile was supposed to be allotted for the “Capability Requirements for the Operations of the Philippine Coast Guard in the West Philippine Sea”. Another P1 billion was allotted as a credit facility exclusively for agrarian reform beneficiaries, through the Land Bank in coordination with the Department of Agriculture. Both projects had prior approval of the President at the time the memo was submitted.

From the above, DAP has all the markings of presidential pork. It is a mechanism used to pool so-called “savings” then utilize these for “priority local projects” that are often upon the recommendation of the local and national politicians. Abad said that some 116 projects were funded through the DAP. All of these projects had presidential approval, he said.

One justice had asked Abad if the allegations of bribery during the Corona impeachment were true. Abad said there was no bribery and that the DAP funds did not go directly to the lawmakers.

Maybe. But isn’t that what the PDAF was all about? Those accused of corruption in the PDAF always say that they never touched the money; that they simply recommended projects and that implementation was done by government agencies. Yet everyone knows that in the course of implementation, the money does always end up with the politician. DAP is no different, especially when the budget secretary says politicians merely “recommend”.

DAP the stimulus mechanism may be “dead” according to the DBM, but the presidential authority used to pool “savings”, and utilize these for items not included in the General Appropriations Act, that’s a different matter altogether. The authority to utilize “savings” for the pet projects of politicians remains. That authority, if we are to believe the Solicitor General, is a valid exercise of presidential prerogative.

DAP’s not dead. And so is the corruption that comes with this serving of presidential pork.

  Revilla Roxas Aquino
 Did a meeting take place? “Inimbitahan ako ni DILG Secretary Mar Roxas sa kanilang bahay sa Cubao…Ipinatanggal niya ang kanyang plaka, pinaupo niya ako sa likuran at pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami patungo sa Malacañang.” “Sa isyu naman ng pagpupulong nila ni Pangulong P-Noy, natural sa Pangulo na humarap sa matataas na opisyal ng bayan.” “I was just confirming reports that there were a lot of sectors exerting a lot of pressure on the senators during the trial.” 
What was the meeting about? “Aaminin ko sa inyo, ako ay nabigla dahil tila dinidiktahan ako ng Pangulo (kaugnay ng impeachment).” “Dati kaming magkasama ni Senator Bong sa Senado kaya nang iparating niya na mayroon siyang gustong i-take-up sa Pangulo kasama ang Cityhood ng Bacoor at ang kanyang pagiging Pangulo ng Partido Lakas, gumawa ako ng paraan para magkausap sila. “We were trying to lessen the pressure on all of them (senator-judges).
What happened during the meeting? “Habang nag-aalmusal kami ng pan de sal, kesong puti, itlog, hamon, tapa, sinangag, at mga prutas, bumangka si Secretary Mar tungkol sa mga dahilan kung bakit dapat ma-impeach si dating Chief Justice Corona. Bago kami magtapos, nagulat ako nang sinabi sa akin ng Presidente… “Pare, parang awa mo na, Ibalato mo na sa akin ito. Kailangan siya ma-impeach.” Sabay sunod naman ni Secretary Butch Abad, “Magtulungan tayo Senator.”   “What I was trying to do was basically ensure that they decide on the merits of the (impeachment) case rather than any other outside factor.”
Anything else you want to say? “Sya ang nag-imbita sa akin, si Boy Pick-up…Tamaan ng kidlat kung sino ang nagisinungaling.”
“Hindi solusyon sa problema niya ang paglilihis ng isyu, pagbaluktot sa katotohanan at panloloko ng tao.” So was it right for me to just step aside while all these sectors were really threatening, pressuring and doing things to our senators?” (Aquino also admits to meeting with other senators during this period.)

What is clear is that a meeting did take place. All three confirm this.

With the exception of Mar Roxas, both Revilla and Aquino admit that the agenda of the meeting was the impeachment trial. Mar says it is the cityhood of Bacoor and Revilla’s chairmanship of Lakas. No one believes Mar.

Aquino says he was merely trying to lessen the pressure on the senator-judges… by exerting presidential pressure on one of them. Amazing, right? The President believes people are actually stupid enough to believe this shiz.

In fact, when the President was asked who were these sectors purportedly exerting “a lot of pressure” on the senator-judges, he replied… “Do I have audiotapes? Do we have affidavits? I have none,” he said, except “intelligence reports.”

Ah ganun. 

What makes the meeting troubling is that there are indications that the President attempted to bribe Revilla. There is no clearer indication of this than the presence of Budget Secretary Butch Abad. Why did the president need Abad to be there? Because Abad is the chief architect of the Disbursement Acceleration Program or DAP, that special fund considered part of the presidential pork that was believed to be used as reward money for the conviction of Corona, among others. “Magtulungan tayo,” says Abad. That’s like a talking to a guy with a sackful of money asking you to do something for him. What else could “magtulungan tayo” mean? If that’s not an attempt at bribery, I don’t know what is.

That’s an impeachable offense and once again raises questions about Aquino’s fitness to lead the nation. 



Last December 12, as the country reeled from the effects of Yolanda, a massive power rate hike, and increases in the prices of LPG, the Department of Transportation and Communication decided to hold a “one-time” public consultation on the “proposed” MRT-LRT fare hike. The so-called consultation would be a venue for government to present the new fare matrix and the basis for the new fares. Or so we thought.

Bayan and other cause-oriented groups such as RILES Network, PISTON and Anakbayan had asked the DOTC for copies of documents related to the fare increase as early as June 24, 2013. A letter was sent to the Secretary of the DOTC. We received a reply dated July 2, 2013 which included some links to websites but did not include any of the documents that would explain the basis of the fare increase or the process by which the fares are determined.

Six months later, DOTC calls for a consultation and still we have not been provided with any documents. What the DOTC presented last December 12 was a 64-slide Powerpoint presentation. It was definitely not a proper public hearing.

What have we learned so far? Not much has changed with the proposed increase since it was first presented in 2011. The increase is still very significant as the maximum fares would double in some cases.


Stations SV Fare SV Fare  SJ FARE SJ FARE
Baclaran Baclaran 29 Bclrn 30
EDSA 12 29 15 30
Libertad 13 28 15 30
Gil Puyat 13 27 15 30
Vito Cruz 14 26 15 30
Quirino 15 25 15 30
Pedro Gil 16 24 20 30
UN Ave. 17 23 20 30
Central 18 22 20 30
Carriedo 19 22 20 30
D. Jose 19 21 20 30
Blumentrit 20 20 20 20
Tayuman 21 20 30 20
Bambang 21 19 30 20
Abad Santos 22 18 30 20
R. Papa 23 17 30 20
5th Avenue 24 16 30 20
Monumento 25 15 30 15
Balintawak 27 13 30 15
Roosevelt 29 Rsvlt 30 Rsvlt

The current maximum fare for LRT 1 is P20 for stored value tickets. Under the proposed scheme, the new maximum fare would be P29 for stored value and P30 for single journey tickets, a 50% increase from the current maximum fare. The LRTA says the average increase per commuter per trip, based on the average distance traveled, would be P4.70 per trip or P9.40 for a round trip. Single journey tickets will come in P15, P20 and P30 and will be significantly more expensive than the fares for stored value tickets.


Stations SVFare SVFare SJFare SJFare
Recto Recto 24 Recto 25
Legarda 12 23 15 25
Pureza 14 22 15 25
V. Mapa 15 21 15 25
J. Ruiz 16 19 20 20
Gilmore 17 18 20 20
Betty-Go B 18 17 20 20
Cubao 19 15 20 15
Anonas 21 14 25 15
Katipunan 22 13 25 15
Santolan 24 Sntln 25 Sntln

For the LRT 2, the new maximum fare would be P24 for stored value tickets and P25 for single journey tickets, an increase of 66% from the current maximum fare of P15. Single journey tickets will come in P15, P20 and P25 values. The LRTA estimates that the average impact on commuters, given the average distance traveled, will be P5.60 per trip. That’s P11.20 increase if you go round trip. Those who have taken the LRT 2 know that most of its passengers are actually students studying in the university belt in Manila.


Stations Fare Fare
North Avenue North Avenue 28
Quezon Avenue 13 28
Kamuning 13 24
Cubao 16 24
Santolan 16 24
Oritgas 20 20
Shaw 20 20
Boni 20 20
Guadalupe 24 16
Buendia 24 16
Ayala 24 13
Magallanes 28 13
Taft 28 Taft

The maximum fare of the MRT 3 will go up from P15 to P28 for single journey and stored value tickets. That’s an 87% increase from the current maximum fare. The minimum fare also goes up from P10 to P13. According to the DOTC, the average increase per passenger per trip of the new fare matrix, based on the average distance traveled, would be a whopping P7.92 per trip or P15.84 for a round trip. That’s nearly P16 increase for a round trip.

As we said, the increase is significant. Coming on the heels of increases in electricity rates, oil prices and premiums for SSS and Philhealth, and without any significant wage increase, the new fares will burn a hole in the pockets of commuters.

Let us now examine the basis for the increase. Is there a legitimate ground for such fares? How did the new fares come to be? What is the basis of the computations? How were the rates approved?

The DOTC justified the increase by saying that the government should be reducing its subsidy for the train lines and that commuters should be the ones paying for the real cost of transportation (users pay principle). It also said that the train fares need to be adjusted so that they would be closer to the fares of other land transport such as buses and AUV/FX. However, the DOTC failed to present any basis for their computations, other than the so called need to reduce government subsidy and the need to continue paying debts incurred in the construction of the train lines.


Let’s first address the argument that the train fares need to approximate the fares of other land transport. This is obviously without basis, the comparison is between apples and oranges. Land transport such as buses and AUV/FX are being operated for private profits. The train lines receive subsidy and are considered part of government’s service. These train lines are the fastest and cheapest means of transportation to bring workers and employees to their workplaces and to bring students to their schools. It is government’s obligation to provide this kind of service for working people and students because in the end, the whole economy benefits.

As for the question of subsidy, government says that the actual fare for the MRT is P53.96 but that commuters only pay an average fare of P12.40 while government subsidizes P41.56. How and why the “actual fare” reached P53.96, they do not explain.

What they do say is that government has been subsidizing the MRT at about P6-7 billion a year and that this subsidy should be reduced. What they do not sufficiently explain is why the need for a P6-7 billion yearly subsidy. What is government subsidizing here?

Under the MRT’s Build Lease Transfer Agreement, the train line has financial obligations in the form of Equity Rental Payments and Administrative Costs amounting to P5.504 billion and Taxes, Duties and Fees amounting to P2.088 billion. These debts are the result of an onerous contract during the Ramos administration that guaranteed the profits of the private developers. For example, the private developers were given a 15% guaranteed return on investment even if the trains were filled or not. Such were the demands of the private developers before “investing” in this so-called public-private partnership venture. In fact the loans of these private developers were also guaranteed by the Philippine government.

If the government thinks the subsidy is too much, then it should stop honoring the patently disadvantageous BLT Agreement which is the source of the financial woes of the MRT. It is this debt which is being passed on to the commuters via the proposed fare hike. It is this debt which government wants us to shoulder.

As for the LRT 1 and 2, this is a slightly different situation. The people at the LRTA combined the financial standing of LRT 1 and 2 (amounting to P4 billion) to make it appear that both trains were bleeding financially and therefore an increase is necessary for both.

However, in this presentation in 2011, the LRTA showed that even without a fare increase, the LRT 1 would do just fine. It would still have an excess of P23 million at the end of the year. It is the LRT 2 which has a deficit.

It is not clear how much LRT 1 and 2 have respectively in terms of obligations. During the consultation, the LRTA admitted that it is LRT 2 which has the bigger debt. Based on the LRTA’s estimates, LRT 1 will have the bigger revenue from the fare hike at P621 million compared to LRT 2’s P321 million revenues. This is because LRT 1 has a bigger ridership than LRT 2.  By combining financial obligations and revenues of the two different train lines, the effect is that commuters of LRT 1 are also paying for the debts of LRT 2.


Meanwhile, the MRT 3 hopes to generate an additional P1.122 billion in revenues from the fare hike. All in all, the fare hike from LRT 1 and 2 and MRT 3 will give the government P2.06 billion in additional revenues.

The additional revenues will be used to compensate for the subsidy reduction for the trains. When we asked the MRT officials how much would the subsidy reduction be under the 2014 budget, they said P200 million. So where will the P1.2 billion in additional MRT revenues go? They did not say.

Also noticeable from the presentation was the very low non-rail revenues of the LRT 1 and 2 and MRT3. The non-rail revenues are generated from advertising and development of commercial space in train stations and other facilities. The LRT 1 and 2 had a combined non-rail revenue of P227 million, or just 6.1% of total revenues. For MRT3, non-rail revenues comprise a measly P27 million or 1.2% of total revenues. In other countries, non-rail revenues comprise up to 20% of total revenues. This is indeed strange since so many malls and commercial establishments are connected to the LRT and MRT. The trains themselves are moving billboards. What we know in the case of MRT3 is that the revenues from ads and development of commercial space go not to the government but to a private corporation owned by the original developers. This is another result of the onerous contract between the government and the private developers.


Many Filipinos seemed to welcome the arrival of US troops to aid in relief efforts for victims of Typhoon Haiyan, believed to be one of the strongest storms recorded in history. The devastation was just too extensive and the Philippine government was incompetent, disorganized and unprepared to meet the needs of the victims.

It was during the first 48 hours in the aftermath of the storm that US forces began establishing a presence in the Eastern Visayas region. In a matter of days, US air and naval assets were being moved from Japan to Tacloban City in Leyte. About 300 US forces were initially deployed. In the first week of the calamity, the US Department of Defense said it would ramp up its ground presence to 1,000 US troops. The USS George Washington also arrived from Hong Kong and was stationed off Samar Island. Some 8,000 US troops were reported to have been involved in the relief operations.

On November 15, newscaster Noli de Castro, a former Philippine vice president, said that US troops were the ones directing air traffic at the Tacloban airport.

The US has a long history with the Samar and Leyte islands. It was in this region that Filipinos fought American colonizers, resulting in the Balanggiga massacre of US troops in 1901. In retalitation for the massacre, Samar was declared a “howling wilderness” by US Gen. Jacob Smith, who ordered the killing every male over the age of 10 capable of bearing arms. The church bells taken by the US soldiers from the Balanggiga town still remain in American custody and are considered trophies of war. It was in Leyte where Gen. Douglas MacArthur landed with Philippine leaders as the US led the “liberation”of the Philippines from the Japanese colonizers, only to have the Philippine revert to being a US neo-colony saddled with two of the largest overseas US military bases.

The return to Leyte of the US soldiers has been hailed as some kind of “second coming” of MacArthur. Now US troops are helping bring relief goods and evacuating people from disaster-stricken areas. The US was said to be “liberating” the people from hunger and despair.

But behind the humanitarian rhetoric and military show of force is a disturbing agenda by the superpower that calls us its “special friend”. Some have in fact openly praised the US humanitarian efforts as a brilliant way of reestablishing US presence in the Philippines more than two decades after the dismantling of US bases. They have pointed out how the so-called US humanitarian mission came just at the right time, when the US and Philippine governments were negotiating increased US military access to Philippine facilities.

In an eye-opneing op-ed piece on USA Today, Jonah Blank said that “deploying military resources for disaster relief is a remarkably effective — and inexpensive — investment in the future.”

One of the largest such deployments in history, the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other assets following the Asian tsunami of 2004, is estimated to have cost $857 million. That’s roughly the price of three days’ operations in Afghanistan last year,” Blanks said.

Like any investment, the US hopes to get some positive returns from its engagement in Eastern Visayas, as Blank explains.

The goodwill the tsunami relief brought the U.S. is incalculable. Nearly a decade later, the effort may rank as one of the most concrete reasons Southeast Asian nations trust the long-term U.S. commitment to a strategy of Asian rebalancing. The Obama administration recognizes the value of disaster relief. As the Pentagon attempts to shift more of its weight to the Asian Pacific region while balancing a shrinking budget, this could turn out to be one of the best decisions it could make,” Blank said.

Blank by the way describes himself as a “senior political scientist” for the conservative think-tank RAND Corporation which provides research for the US armed forces and is funded by the US government. He has also worked as a policy director for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Jonathan Bogais of the University of Sydney also situates the US deployment in Eastern Visayas within the onging negotiations for greater US military access to the Philippines. He cites the rotational presence of US troops in Mindanao, the setting up of a US private defense contractor in Subic to service US warships, and the tensions between China and the Philippines as current issues related to the expanding US presence in the country.

In the midst of this humanitarian tragedy, Typhoon Haiyan has delivered the means for the US to show solidarity to its Pacific ally. It has also allowed the US to send a clear message to China that it has the muscle needed to intervene at short notice in the region to protect its national interest if it feels it necessary,” Bogais said.

It is clear that the national interest Bogias was refering to is not the Philippines’ own but rather the US’ strategic economic and security interests in Asia.

In another article entitled “Military’s aid operations help promote US interests”, Dan De Luce of the Agence France-Presse notes that “the rapid deployment of US naval ships, cargo planes, helicopters and troops to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan underscores America’s growing emphasis on disaster relief missions.These are seen as a strategic tool, allowing the United States to exert ‘soft power’ through means usually tied to ‘hard power’.”

“The US military’s relief efforts in the storm-ravaged Philippines will save lives, but also illustrate how humanitarian operations promote Washington’s interests in the Asia-Pacific,” the aritcle said.

That growing emphasis on disaster response is also evident during the annual Balikatan exercies between the US and the Philippines and has been used a justification for the permanent and continuing presence of the US military in the country under the Visiting Forces Agreement. In the course of these exercises, the US is able to project its military power in the region and asserts its role as a Pacific power.

“This (disaster response) is a classic example of why we need to be forward deployed and forward engaged, why we conduct theatre security cooperation, why we establish these relationships,” De Luce quotes a senior Marine Corps official.

“The speed with which US forces are able to respond to Typhoon Haiyan highlights the importance of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises we carry out regularly in the Asia-Pacific,” de Luce quotes Pentagon spokesman George Little told a news conference Tuesday.

De Luce too notes that the US deployment in Eastern Visayas takes place during the negotiations for expanded US access to the Philippines’ bases and ports.

Finally, we have Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto del Rosario to confirm our suspicions.

“What [we have seen] in Central Philippines as a result of this typhoon, and the assistance provided in terms of relief and rescue operation … demonstrates the need for this framework agreement that we are working out with the United States for increased rotational presence. It accentuates one of the main purposes of this framework, which is to make humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and response one of the major aspects of this agreement,” del Rosario told the media.

Del Rosario is practically begging the US military to reestablish permanent bases in the country. After all, the Philippines is visited by typhoons every year, apart from being part of the earthquake belt. Disasters are almost a certainty in this country.

From a negotiating standpoint, Del Rosario just showed the other side that we need them more than they need us. He just laid all his cards on the table and gave the US the upper hand.

Del Rosario also affirms a well-known fact, that the Aquino government does not have any long-term plans for disaster preparedness and would likely just wait for the next US aircraft carrier to bail us out in the event of another calamity. Disaster response, a basic function of the national government, is now dependent on a foreign army.

Now some would argue that philanthropy is philanthropy, whatever the motives are. Those C-130’s and Osprey’s still delivered relief to storm-ravaged communities, whatever geopolitical interests are at stake. Who could dispute the fact that typhoon victims were airlifted out of the province? Or that relief goods were air-dropped from US helicopters?

American activist and blogger David L. Swanson has this to say in reaction to the US deployment: “Good will is dependent on not dominating people militarily and economically — yet that seems to be exactly the goal (of the operations)”. He calls Blank’s earlier suggestions of using the relief operations to boost US presence in the Philippines as “taking advantage of the suffering Filipinos”.

As de Luce said in his AFP article, the US relief mission saved lives, but in the process promoted US geo-political interests. Military deployment is not always about humanitarian assistance. The primary objective of military deployment is war, or the preparation for war, which is what the US is undertaking through its rebalancing or pivot towards Asia. The US is pre-positioning troops and weapons in Asia not because it wants to help the next country that would be hit by a storm, but because it wants to strengthen its position as a global power, capable of imposing its will on other countries. 

With del Rosario’s latest statements, it now seems that the Philippines is close to concluding an agreement that would allow de facto US basing in Subic, Clark and other Philippine facilities. To make the proposal acceptable, the Aquino government will simply flash images of Haiyan and Tacloban. Never mind developing self-reliance and the capacity to prepare for future calamities. Never mind securing the people at the first instance, even before foreign assistance arrives. Never mind sovereignty.

Aquino merely has to invoke his government’s incompetence to justify its subservience. ###


Tacloban City, Leyte airport damaged by Yolanda

Photo by AP

In the aftermath of Yolanda/Haiyan’s devastation, many are now asking about the apparently slow pace of government’s response to the needs of the hundreds of thousands of storm victims, especially in Eastern Visayas. Just last November 11, Aquino went on national TV to appeal for understanding amid the apparent inadequacy of government’s efforts.

The November 11 speech is a far cry from the November 7 speech, delivered on the eve of Yolanda’s landfall, and apparently drafted to assure the nation that government was doing its job to prepare the people for the impact of the storm.

From his November 7 speech, we can get the following points.

1. The National Government was aware of the strength of the storm and its impact on the communities. Aquino said they were monitoring the threat (banta) of a storm surge where water levels can rise 5 to 6 meters in some areas. However, the National Government thru the NDRRMC, apparently left it to the LGU’s to interpret the information that was being given them, and to make plans according to their interpretation. Gawin na po natin ang ating magagawa habang hindi pa lumalapag si Yolanda. Uulitin ko po: Seryosong peligro ito, at maaaring mabawasan ang epekto kung gagamitin natin ang impormasyon upang maghanda,” Aquino said. The apparently decentralized and not-so-hands-on approach would later on prove to be problematic. In an interview by CNN, Tacloban Mayor Alfredo Romualdez said that “if authorities had given a different sort of warning before the storm, comparing it to a tsunami instead of merely calling it a typhoon, more people may have survived. We’ve done drills on tsunami. And we do (tsunami) drills, almost 80% of them really get out. Storm surge, they don’t understand,” Romualdez said.

2. The National Government said that it already prepositioned relief goods and that its air and naval assets were already on standby. Fully mission capable po ang tatlo nating C130 upang rumesponde sa nangangailangan. Naka-standby na rin po ang 32 na eroplano at helicopter ng ating Air Force. Nakapusisyon na po ang 20 barko mula sa ating Philippine Navy sa Cebu, Bicol, Cavite, at Zamboanga. Ang mga relief goods ay naka-preposition na rinsa karamihan ng mga apektado o maaaring maapektuhang lalawiganFive days after the storm hit the first coastal town in Eastern Samar, relief has not reached many of the devastated villages. Hunger is on the rise. PNP Chief Allan Purisima in one interview said that the prepositioned relief goods were also flooded and swept away, indicating that the government may have underestimated the impact of the storm.

3. After leaving it to the LGU’s and concerned people to interpret the information, the National Government seemed prepared to lay the blame on the people if there are many casualties. Marami na po tayong pinagdaanan sa taong ito; tulungan na po sana natin at huwag nang pahirapan ang ating mga Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils at kanilang mga personnel,” Aquino said.

 It should therefore come as no surprise that Aquino faulted the LGU’s a day after the storm hit, describing Tacloban as ill-prepared for the storm surge.

However, two days after the storm, it became clear it was the National Government who had not done enough. In the days after the first footage of the devastation were aired on national media, the National Government sought to highlight looting and downplay the number of the deaths, the acute shortage of supplies, widespread hunger and the inability of government to respond to the needs of many of the victims. And the promised aid contained in the President’s November 7 speech did not materialize.

Aquino went on air again to deliver a speech to the nation on November 11. He starts off with praising the National Government’s efforts and downplaying the impact of the storm on several provinces. Nagpapasalamat po tayo sa mga dalubhasa mula sa PAGASA, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Phivolcs, at DOST, na kumalap at nagbigay ng tama at detalyadong impormasyon na naging dahilan upang makapaghanda nang maayos ang ating mga kababayan. Ito ang nagbigay-daan para sa iniuulat na mababang casualty count mula sa ilang mga probinsyang dinaanan din ng bagyo, tulad ng Oriental at Occidental Mindoro, Negros Occidental, Palawan, Aklan, at Romblon, kung saan maagang nakapaghanda ang lokal na pamahalaan. How the president can still claim credit for lower casualties in some areas while there’s a mind-boggling number of deaths in other areas is truly unbelievable.  The president can use this statement to feel good about what he’s done, but the people are hardly convinced and their worries hardly assuaged.

Bagaman nakapagtala ng mababang casualty count sa maraming mga probinsyang dinaanan ni Yolanda, sa mga lugar naman na tila naembudo ang bagyong ito, talaga naman pong malaki ang pinsalang nasaksihan nati,” Aquino said. Not only is the statement a form of pampalubag-loob for the people, it also provides a way out for the national government. When the casualty figures are low, government claims credit and says it is due to the timely information they provided to the provinces. When casualty rates are high, government blames nature. But as Romualdez mentioned, there may be a disconnect between the information being provided and the capacity of the local government units to interpret such information.

As pointed out by the Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment, the National Government failed to prepare the nation for the storm surges brought about by Yolanda despite the available information. The national government could have laid down clear, unequivocal guidelines and enforced these guidelines rather than leave it to LGU’s on how they choose to interpret data. It is not enough that the President refer the people to websites on the eve of the storm (Para sa dagdag na kaalaman, pumunta po tayo sa mga website ng PAGASA, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, at ng Project NOAH upang makita kung gaano kaapektado ang inyong komunidad sa pagdating ng bagyo). It is not enough to say on national TV that his speech was the last warning (Magsilbi rin po sanang babala ang pahayag na ito sa ating mga LGU: Seryosong peligro po ang kinakaharap ng inyong mga nasasakupan).

In his November 11 speech, gone were the references to air and naval assets or the supposedly prepositioned relief goods. Aquino instead makes references to the distribution of family food packs, saying that as of that date, 24,000 packs have been distributed to 8 of the biggest baranggays in Tacloban City. Problem is, Tacloban has a population of more than 220,000. And there were many more people outside Tacloban who were reeling from hunger and sickness.

The mass movement in the Philippines and abroad is currently undertaking a massive relief campaign for Yolanda victims. Thousands of activists are being mobilized to raise funds, resources and distribute relief goods and supplies for victims. Private organizations have been helping in a huge way. However, these efforts do not change the fact that the primary responsibility for relief and rehabilitation still rests with the government. So as we do our share to help the victims, we must also continue to call on the Aquino administration to do its job and do it right.

The people of Eastern Visayas are now victims several times over. By the poverty from the unequal socio-economic relations, making the region the 3rd poorest in the country and number one when it comes to incidence of hunger even before the typhoon hit. By the corrupt politicians who looted public funds as seen from the pork barrel scam. And by super storm Yolanda and the slow and inadequate government response.

The news reports are becoming frustrating as the days go by. Everyone but the national government seems to know something is not right. CNN’s Anderson Cooper had this much to say of the situation.  “As to who’s in charge of the Philippine side of the whole operation, that is not really clear. I’m just surprised that on this day 5, maybe I’ve gotten here late, that things would be well in hand. It does not seem like that.”

Yolanda is to Aquino as Katrina was to Bush.  And at some point after things start to stabilize, there must be an audit of the government’s  preparation and response to the super storm.  As Cooper went on to say in his November 13 report,  “The people in Tacloban have great dignity and deserve better than what they have gotten.”###

Photo by Raul Banias

Photo Retuers

The dictionary defines the word “hijack” to mean to take control of a moving vehicle such as a plane. I have been hearing  the word quite often in reference to rallies against the pork barrel system. Every time there is a rally, there seems to be the unfounded fear that the Left would “hijack” the event. I have come across such accusations on social media, on Twitter and Facebook. Some questions are well meaning, while others are just plain malicious with no other intention but to see the mass action fail.

I have tried my best to answer the well-meaning questions on Twitter and FB. I appreciate the efforts of  other netizens who try to put some sense into the discussions, not because they are leftists or anything but because they have enough common sense to know that we need a united front.

I say that the fear is often unfounded because this is hardly ever substantiated by anything other than one’s bias, or by an insidious motive to divide the broad front against pork corruption. One version of this is that the Left will hijack the rally and use it as a platform to attack Aquino. The anti-pork rally will become an anti-Aquino rally.

There are some issues we must answer here. Can the Left indeed hijack a rally such as the one in Luneta or Ayala? So how does one hijack a rally?  And what’s wrong in directing the protest at Aquino?

Yesterday, someone posted that a group of about 500 people at Ayala were hijacking the event by unfurling placards calling for the ouster of Aquino. I personally did not see this group that was being referred to so I doubt its accuracy. But assuming the report was true, I seriously doubt that a group of 500 people can hijack an event, not when there is an organizing committee that takes charge of the program and the conduct of the rally. The Left is part of that organizing committee as it works among the various groups and individuals helping out the event. The program committee is also supported by professional artists. We had an excellent director and various support staff. The program line up was more or less fixed. Unless the so-called 500 people got a bigger stage a, louder sound system and a bigger mobilization than the one that was already in Ayala, they couldn’t really do much in terms of hijacking the event.

Photo Val Rodriguez, Phil Star

The same fear was also raised in Luneta last August 26, that the Leftists with their streamers and placards and loud sound system, would hijack the rally. Well, there wasn’t much to “hijack” during the first Luneta rally since for the most part, there wasn’t even a centralized program as rally organizers did not want to have one. People could basically just do their own thing and find their own spot in the park. Unless you had a crowd and sound system as big as an El Shaddai Sunday gathering, hijacking Luneta would not be possible.

Rallies have organizing committees that prepare the program and conduct of the event. Groups discuss how the rally will take place. The Left is often part of the organizing committee. And the Left has always been upfront with its intentions. For example during the first Luneta rally, we informed other organizers early on that we would be marching to Mendoza after Luneta. We wanted to address our demands straight to the President.

I’ve seen a lot of ridiculous reactions in the run up to rallies, often coming as attempts to divide or scare people.

For example before the first Luneta rally, I got asked regarding the burning of an effigy. Apparently some folks saw a media report on a “pork” effigy which would be brought to Luneta. Some folks started raising the alarm that an effigy would be burned. They made a big deal out of it. When I checked what they were referring to, it turned out to be a papier mache’ of a small pig and it was not meant to be burned. (Some questions were well-meaning but others were just far-out).

Pero may mas OA pang reaksyon.

At the command tent in Luenta, as we were preparing for the rally, one person exclaimed, “Oh no, they’re burning an effigy!” When we looked, it turned out to be a group using incense for a morning prayer. OA di ba? Pero buti sana kung simpleng OA lang ang problema. Making a big deal out of these issues is a calculated attempt to scare and confuse people, a move that would serve the interests of Malacanang and the pork defenders.

A  day before the August 26 Luneta rally, a malicious and anonymous “Ibagsak and rehimeng  US-Aquino”  SMS  started circulating. The text said that the uprising was to start in Luneta and end in Mendiola. The text message was obviously a scare tactic. Bayan had no problem denouncing the SMS since it was never ours to begin with. Other netizens reposted our disclaimer. A similar SMS circulated a day before the Ayala rally, again designed to make it appear that the text came from the Left. Some netizens quickly exposed the scare tactic even before we even had to. (Meanwhile, a tweet by one Leah Navarro, staunch supporter of Aquino, said that that SMS was proof that the rally had already been hijacked. So gets nyo na sino nakikinabang sa mga ganung text?)

Our group has always been upfront with our position on the Aquino regime. We never hid the fact that we are opposed to this regime on many issues such as land reform, human rights, sovereignty, economic development and so on. We hold protests during Aquino’s State of the Nation Address, and that’s no secret. So expect that the participation of the Left in these broad anti-pork rallies will also include a sharper critique of and a more direct message addressed to the President.

And why not? The pork barrel issue clearly calls for it.

Aquino is THE biggest hindrance to the removal of the pork barrel system. We have enumerated the reasons in our previous public statements.

  1. Aquino refuses to scrap the pork barrel system, both the congressional pork and the much bigger presidential pork. In the 2014 budget, while PDAF is no longer there, the funds were merely transferred to other line agencies while lawmakers retained the “right” to nominate their pet projects which will appear as line items in the budget. That’s still pork, no matter how you cook it.
  2. Aquino has asked the Supreme Court to lift the TRO on the release of the remaining 2012 PDAF and the Malamapaya funds.
  3. Aquino has given special treatment to Janet Napoles, threatening to undermine the investigation and prosecution of those involved in the scam. This may lead to selective prosecution.
  4. Aquino has been caught red-handed in disbursing so-called government “savings” as a form of pork and incentive for politicians. Many have pointed out the unconstitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program, yet the Palace is sticking to its defense. Aquino wants to preserve the system of lump sum discretionary funds and the corrupt system of patronage that pork makes possible.

Which brings us to the next point. Why shouldn’t the rally be critical of Aquino? What’s wrong if groups carry placards that say Aquino is the Pork Barrel King? What’s wrong with directing the demand to abolish pork squarely at Malacanang?

(Of course the event itself has a common theme and all participating groups and individuals agree to that. However, the common theme is just that. It’s a common theme but it is not the ONLY call nor is it the maximum demand that some groups  can push. The common theme or call is not a ceiling or a cap. It is the minimum basis of unity for holding the event. )

Now, the usual modus of the die-hard Aquino supporter is this: they spread on social media that the protest against pork will be turned into a venue to attack Aquino. They believe that since Aquino is SO popular, portraying an event as ANTI-Aquino will make the event flop. It will turn off people. Grabe din ang arrogance no?

Now some folks easily fall for this trap for one reason or another. They will make the unnecessary disclaimer that this is NOT an anti-Aquino rally in order to pacify the die-hard pro-Aquino intrigeros on social media who keep saying that an anti-Aquino call would prevent others from joining. They sometimes fail to see that the intention of the intrigue is to force the organizers to say that the rally is NOT anti-Aquino, NOT oppositional to Aquino, in order to blunt the message. So that later on, the President can say that he and the protesters are on the same side. The rally is in fact in support of the Daang Matuwid and the President. The President’s officials are even willing to meet with the rally organizers so they can sit down and discuss alternatives. We’re all in this together. Damay-damay na etc etc. .

Galing di ba? So who’s  hijacking the rally now?

What I also find bothersome and insulting is that in the attempt to appease these so-called “pro-Aquino yet anti-pork netizens”, some protest organizers, wittingly or unwittingly, reinforce the unfounded allegations and biases against the Left.

So what if some groups carry anti-Aquino calls, isn’t that within their right to express themselves? That doesn’t negate the character of the Ayala event as an anti-pork rally. So why make a disclaimer that can be turned and used against the rally organizers? Why make a disclaimer that can be used to attack one of the participants of the rally, particularly the Left?

I saw one accusation, though no direct reference was made, that the Left was “nakikisakay at nanggagamit” and that they are no different from politicians. If indeed it was the left that was being referred to, I would want that person to know what the Left did for the Ayala rally so that the person could be disabused of the notion that the Left was “nakikisakay at nanggagamit”.

The Left brought in people early to the Ayala rally, occupying a huge space that was there when the program was about to start and the Makati employees had not arrived. Kumakalog ang Paseo nung simula dahil wala pang tao. The Left also brought in other allies and anti-pork groups and personalities, some of whom were hesitant to join the Ayala rally because they thought that the message was too soft on Malacanang. (Yes there are those types too.) We mobilized artists, support staff, speakers as well as resources. It was the Bayan forces who stayed throughout the program at Ayala, even when the heavy rains started pouring. They stayed up to the end of the rally. Hindi sila bumitiw.

For those not familiar with organizing rallies, mobilizing people is difficult work. You prepare transportation, food, marshals, placards and stuff. It’s not as easy as writing a press release or making a Facebook meme. And these groups, the workers, the farmers, urban poor, professionals; they all made their own sacrifices to make the event a success by mobilizing their members from the communities and workplaces that were relatively far from Makati.

Contrast the efforts of the workers and farmers say to one Jim Paredes who is noisy on social media but admitted in one of the meetings for the first Million People March in Luneta that he was NOT for the abolition of PDAF (because it can be used for good) but was only supportive of prosecuting Napoles.

Contrast the efforts of the students and urban poor groups mobilizing to folks such as those in the Black and White Movement who during the anti-Arroyo protests only mobilized enough people to fill a van, yet they get to be interviewed all over the place as if they mobilized the entire rally in Ayala. (Ask any of the groups active in the anti-GMA movement and they’ll tell you the same).

The good thing though with these protests is that those actively involved have “leveled-up” so to speak. Hats off to the commitment displayed by netizens, bloggers, artists such as Juana Change and many others, who really worked to make the rally successful. Sila yung totoong nagtatrabaho. Hindi tulad nung nagte-text o retweet lang ng kung anu-anung kabalbalan, kunwari concerned sa kalalabasan ng rally pero sa totoo lang wala naman silang intensyong dumalo ng rally, at ang gusto lang ay manggulo at manghati.

Our understanding of the issue has also developed. The first Luneta rally was expectedly focused on Napoles and PDAF. The succeeding rallies tried to raise the discussion to lump sum discretionary spending. In Ayala, we’ve seen how participants of the rally gained the understanding that pork is not just PDAF. It also includes DAP and other forms of discretionary spending. The call to abolish ALL pork became clearer.

This movement is progressing. This cannot be prevented. The defenders of pork can only hope to divide the movement by attacking the Left, or by arousing some irrational fear of an evil opposition take-over.

The defenders of pork have grown desperate. They will ultimately fail.

Photo Philippine Daily Inquirer

Talumpati sa Forum on Democratization

UP Diliman Sociology Department ,

Setyembre 23, 2012

Magandang umaga po. Ako si Renato Reyes, Jr, isang aktibista na ngayon ay secretry general ng Bagong Alyansang Makabayan. Ngayong 2012 ang ika-20 taon ko bilang aktibista. Maikling panahon pa rin ito kung tutuusin, kumpara sa maraming namulat nung dekada ’60,  ‘70 at ’80 na hanggang ngayon ay kumikilos pa rin.

Nagsimula ang aking involvement sa UP Diliman noong taong 1992, nung freshman ako sa College of Business Administration. Sumapi ako sa League of Filpino Students sa aking ika-3 araw sa kolehiyo.

Lumahok ako matapos kong makita ang isang lightning rally sa University Theater pagkatapos ng freshman orientation. Ang protesta ay laban sa Tuition Fee Increase o TFI. Kami ang unang batch na nakaranas ng P300 per unit, na sa panahong  iyon ay medyo mabigat lalo’t sa mga naunang taon ay P200/unit lang, at bago pa yun ay P40 per unit lang.

Noong una akong sumali sa LFS, aaminin kong medyo na-culture shock ako sa mga aktibista. Galing ako sa isang Catholic school para sa mga lalaki. Kakaiba para sa akin yung mga tibak, at marahil yung UP sa kabuuan.

Sa unang tingin, parang  merong fashion sub-culture yung mga tibak. Gulo-gulo ang mga buhok, punit-punit ang mga pantalon, naka-tsinelas o minsan Our Tribe sandals, o Chuck Taylor sneakers, may tubao, may batik shirt. Pero kung tutuusin, di naman nalalayo ang itsura nila sa mga kilalang personalidad noon sa campus tulad ng Erasersheads, Yano at si Romeo Lee (na mas wild ang itusra noong una kong nakasabay sa jeep).

Yun unang nakausap kong mga tibak, kakaiba din. Yung isa may bandage ang buong braso. Yung isa naman may mahabang scar sa kanyang mukha. Naisip ko, susmaryosep, ang tindi siguro ng mga rally dispersal na dinanas nila. Kinalaunan, malalaman ko na wala palang kinalaman sa rally ang kanilang mga injury. Vehicular accident at rumble ng frat pala ang sanhi.

Unti-unti, nakasalamuha ko ang mas maraming mga aktibista mula sa iba’t ibang kolehiyo. Napagtanto ko na yung problema pala ng UP sa tuition fee increase at mga bulok na facilities ay may kaugnayan din sa mga pambansang patakaran. Sa patakaran sa pambansang budget, sa pagbabayad ng utang at iba pang  panlipunang usapin. Nakita rin namin yung iba pang realidad sa loob at labas ng campus. Medyo nabawasan yung mga stereotype sa mga aktibista ko nung mas malapitan ko na silang makilala.

Nakita ko na may komunidad pala sa loob ng UP campus na dine-demolish din. May mga unionized workers na kinakailangang mag-welga dahil sa di makatarungang mga patakaran sa trabaho. Unang piketline na napuntahan ko ay yung sa mga nagwelgang pampublikong guro habang nasa Philippine Independent Church sila sa Taft Avenue. Nakalahok din kami sa welga sa SM, sa San Miguel dyan sa Aurora Blvd at sa PasVIl  sa may Novaliches. Nakasalamuha din namin ang mga magbubukid mula Gitnang at Timog Luzon.

Nakasama ako sa welga ng mga workers ng SM noong 1994, at dalawang beses na nakaranas ng dispersal sa loob ng SM North (at dahil sa trauma at inis ay ilang buwan din kaming di nanood ng sine dun). Nakaranas na rin ako ng dispersal sa mismong kahabaan ng riles ng LRT sa Maynila.Dun naman sa welga sa Manila Hotel natutuo kaming tumakbo hanggang may lupa dahil hinahabol kami ng mga malulupit na pulis. Nakaranas na rin kaming ma-water cannon, sa loob ng UP campus (Pres. Javier oathtaking).  At syempre, naranasan ko na ding maaresto habang nag-rarally.

Sa mga panahong ito, nakilala ko ang iba’t ibang sektor, mga ordinaryong manggagawa, magsasaka, mga urban poor, mga teachers, health workers at iba pa. Naunawaan ko yung motibasyon nila sa pagpo-protesta. Laging may malalim na batayan kung bakit sila nagpo-protesta, kung bakit kailangang mag-welga, hunger strike, barikada at iba pang porma ng collective action. Kadalasa’y hindi nakasasapat ang mga umiiral na mekanismo ng gobyerno, lalo pa’t hindi pumapabor halimbawa ang sistema ng hustisya para sa mga mahihirap. O di naman kaya masyadong malakas ang pwersa ng employer, o ng landlord kung kaya’t tanging sa sama-samang pagkilos lang pwedeng maisulong yung interes ng mga sektor.

Ah oo nga pala, yung usapin ng interes. Nakita namin yung pag—iral ng mga magkatunggaling interes. Yung interest ng mga makapangyarihan sa ekonomiya at pulitika ay taliwas o kontra dun sa nakararaming inaapi; tulad ng panginoong maylupa at magsasaka sa Hacienda Luisita, yung mga malalaking kapitalista tulad nina Danding Cojuango at Henry Sy at ang kanilang mga manggagawa.

At nakita ko rin na yung pag-protesta ay isang bahagi lamang ng mas malawak na gawain. Malaking bahagi ng oras namin ay inilalaan sa pag-oorganisa, sa edukasyon, sa pagkausap sa mga tao, sa pagbubuo ng mga samahan.

Nabawasan din yung angas naming mga estudyante lalo’t sa maraming pagkakataon, mas malalim ang pagkaka-alam ng mga inoorganisa namin kesa sa aming mga estudyanteng peti-burgis. Mas natutuo kami sa karansan ng mga manggagawa, magsasaka at iba pang maralita.

Isa sa mga inilatag na tanong ng porum na ito ay ang pangangailangang magprotesta at magbuo ng kapangyarihan laban sa mga umiiral na institusyon ng gobyerno. Sa iba’t ibang pagkakataon, kailangan ng mga protest actions para:

  1. maipanalo ang mga immediate demands ng mga sektor sa pamamagitan ng sama-samang pagkilos na magbibigay ng pressure sa mga kinauukulan
  2. maipahayag sa mas makararami ang mga layunin ng kilusan
  3. ma-organisa at ma-konsolida ang mga lalahok tungo sa mas pangmatagalang paglaban

Sa pamamagitan ng sama-samang pagkilos ay nape-pressure ang mga kinauukulan, ang gobyerno, ang administration, ang landlord, para ibigay ang collective demand ng mga nagpo-protesta. Esensyal ito lalo’t kung aasa lang sila sa legal struggle sa mga korte at ahensya ng gobyerno, malamang hindi papabor sa kanila ang resulta.

Sa proseso ng mga actions na ito, naitatambol sa iba pang sektor ang pangangailangan ng pagkilos. Halimbawa yung pakikibaka at tagumpay ng mga magbubukid sa Hacienda Luisita ay nagsisilbing inspirasyon sa iba pang magbubukid na kumilos din.

Ang mga protesta ay hindi lamang para sa kagyat na mga kahilingan. Paraan din ito para ma-organisa ang mga kalahok. Dito nakikita ng mga tao na may kapangyarihan sa kanilang sama-samang pagkilos, na taglay nila ang tunay na kapangyarihan labas sa mga instrumento ng gobyerno.  Ito yung gusto nating i-develop na empowerment, yung sa pamamagitan ng mga organizations, unions at asosasyon. Kinalaunan, magiging mas malakas ito sa kapangyarihan ng mga naghaharing iilan sa lipunan.

Sa history natin, nagkaroon tayo ng mahabang period ng mass protests laban sa Martial Law at Marcos dictatorship, na humantong sa Edsa 1. May nangyari ding Edsa 2. May naganap ding protest movement laban kay GMA, na tumagal bilang pangulo mahigit 9 na taon. Nagkaroon din ng malakas na protest movement para mapatalsik ang base militar ng US sa ating bansa.

Lumalahok din ba kami sa eleksyon? Oo naman, dahil isang larangan din iyon para maisulong ang interests ng iba’t ibang sektor. May mga local elective posts na nilalahukan, at meron din yung tinatawag na partylist system kung saan may maliit na puwang ang mga marginalized sectors para makapsok ng Kongreso. Pero sa pangkalahatang iskema ng mga bagay-bagay, hindi yung elections ang pangunahing pokus ng gawain namin. Yung pagkakaroon ng elective positions, halimbawa sa partylist system, nakakatulong yun, pero marami ding limitasyon ang larangang iyon. Yung mga traditional parties and personalities, yung mga ruling class pa rin ang dominante sa larangang iyan. At kahit yung maliit na espasyo para sa mga marginalized at underrepresented, winawasak na rin ngayon lalo’t marami nang partlylist reps ang di naman talaga marginalized dahil mga impluwensyal at mega-rich sila. Idagdag pa natin na ang AFP ay nangangampanya laban sa mga progresibong grupo.

Sa dakong huli, ang usapin talaga ay tanging ang mamamayan ang makakapagpalaya sa kanyang sarili, at magagawa lamang ito sa sama-samang pagkilos.

Nung naging aktibista kami 20 taon na ang nakaraan, hindi naman namin hangad na mahalal sa gobyerno o maging bahagi ng gobyerno tulad ng ibang grupo dyan. Ang hangad namin ay makaambag sa pagpapalakas ng kilusan nang mamamayan nang sa gayon ay mapalitan nito ang bulok na umiiral na sistemang panig lamang sa iilan.

Tulad nyo, marami din akong agam-agam noon, marami din akong stereotypes. Hindi ko naman kayo masisisi. Pero bukod sa impresyon na ang mga aktibista ay pampatrapik lang sa kalsada, mahalagang ang papel ng kilusang ito sa pagsisiwalat ng mga isyu, pakikipaglaban para sa kagalingan ng iba’t ibang sektor, at sa pagtutulak ng tunay at makabuluhang pagbabago. At sana po ay maging bahagi din kayo ng kilusang ito.

Maraming salamat po.